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Abstract
The problem of water management in Thailand has become an issue because water
resources are predicted to be insufficient for future agricultural development. In exploring
relevant water management methods, an investigation of people's irrigation systems is
instructive.
The objective of this article is to make an economic analysis of traditional water
management institutions in Northern Thailand on the basis of a field survey. The results of
the analysis are as follows.
1) The rules for maintenance of traditional irrigation systems are consistent with the
individual farmer's self-motivation in a labor-surplus economy.
2) The relative scarcity of water resources in the process of agricultural development has
induced a change in the traditional water management institution to alleviate the scarcity.
3) The new institution (so-called strict rotation system) has generally relieved the
congestion of water utilization, but some farmers whose fields lie far from the main canal still
suffer losses from the congestion.
I Introduction
In his discussion of water management in
Thailand, Nakajima [1984] pointed out that
easily exploitable water resources in Thailand
have been exhausted, so that the marginal cost
of large-scale irrigation projects has increased
considerably. Also, existing facilities have not
been fully utilized. Therefore, small-scale
irrigation projects were considered to have a
priority over large ones, as Rijik and van der
Meer [1984] observed. Under these circum-
stances, the further agricultural development of
* f&#iw-, Faculty of Agriculture, Okayama
University, 1-1-1 Tsushimanaka, Okayama 700,
Japan
Thailand will require the efficient use of scarce
resources by farmers themselves (Suraresks
[1980] etc.). This viewpoint is shared by all
scholars interested in irrigation problems m
Asian developing countries. 1)
Research has been already carried out on
traditional irrigation systems in Northern
Thailand. 2) Sektheera and Thorley [1974],
Suraresks [1980] and Ayudhaya [1983] have
elucidated the actual conditions of these
irrigation systems and investigated the roles of
government and people's organizations in water
1) Coward Jr. [1980: Part II] contains a bibliography
of important literature related to this subject.
2) I define the irrigation system as a concept
incorporating physical equipment and human
organization.
229
management. From the anthropological point of
view, Moerman [1968], Potter [1976], Tanabe
[1976] and others have investigated the
relationship between the tightness of social
structure and traditional irrigation institutions.
This article takes a different approach from
these previous studies. It looks at the practical
concern of creating appropriate irrigation or-
ganizations that will enhance the operational
effectiveness of irrigation systems. In this
regard, more emphasis is put on the dynamic
changes within an irrigation system in the
process of economic development. This is
because the most appropriate water manage-
ment system will be affected by economic
conditions. In this way the relevancy of the
induced institutional change hypothesis to
irrigation institutions will be investigated. 3)
This article has two objectives. The first is
to identify the conditions for intensive agricul-
ture in the Chiang Mai Valley and to observe
the changes of traditional irrigation systems
there. The second is to carry out an economic
analysis of traditional irrigation systems in
Northern Thailand. For the latter purpose, two
subjects are examined. One is the effectiveness
of institutional changes in attacking the problem
of scarce water resources caused by intensive
production. The other is the economics of
traditional regulations for weir repair and canal
maintenance.
In treating the first subject, the theory of
quasi-collective goods [Kuchiki . 1978]4) is ap-
3) For "induced institutional change hypothesis",
see Hayami and Ruttan [1971], Binswanger and
Ruttan [1978] etc.
4) According to Kuchiki, the number of users of
quasi-collective production goods is limited and
they have to pay an extra charge for use if the
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plied to building a theoretical model of irrigation
equipment, which is regarded as public goods.
In addition, the difference of productivity
between the farmers who suffered a loss from
the congestion of irrigation use and those who
did not is examined by use of a production
function analysis. Mer estimating labor market
conditions with this estimated production func-
tion, the consistency of the individual farmer's
self-motivation with the regulations is examined
with regard to the second subject.
The results of this study are as follows. 1)
The findings support the hypothesis that the
rules for maintenance of traditional irrigation
systems are compatible with the individual
farmer's self-motivation in a labor-surplus
economy. 2) The relative scarcity of water
resources in the process of agricultural develop-
ment has induced changes in the traditional
water management institutions to alleviate the
scarcity. 3) The new institutions (so-called
strict rotation systems) have relieved the
congestion of water utilization to some extent,
but some farmers whose paddy fields lie far
from the main canal still suffer loss from the
congestion.
II Agriculture and People's Irrigation
Systems in the Village
II-1. Agriculture, Geographical Conditions
and Climate in the Village
The author conducted a field survey m
Mubaan (village) 8, Tambon Ban Kat, Amphoe
(district) San Pa Tong, Changwat (province)
Chiang Mai from December 1984 to January
demand for them exceeds the pennitted quantity,
because of external diseconomy or increasing
cost of public service.
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1985. According to the village headman (Pau
Liang) and his assistants, the population of M8
is 947, the total number of households 270, and
the number of fann households 206 as of
January 14, 1985.
M8 is located in the valley of the Wang River
(Mae Nam Wang) and lies 30 kIn southwest of
Chiang Mai City. The basin has a floor of
semi-recent alluvials and merges with low
terraces, then with middle terraces toward the
sideslopes of the river. This area reportedly
began to be exploited at least 180 years ago. 5)
The irrigation systems in the Wang River basin
are not managed by the government but by the
farmers themselves. These systems have been
maintained by the farmers for more than 100
years and allow the practice of triple cropping
even today.
In San Pa Tong district, rain normally starts
in late April and falls heavily in July [Suraresks
1980]. The rainy season in the Chiang Mai
Valley continues from early July to the middle of
October, and is shorter than in Central Thailand
[Sawat 1973: 89-90]. The amount of annual
rainfall from April to June is rather unstable.
This is an important factor which has a crucial
effect on the growth of dry-season rice after
transplanting [Kaida 1978 ; Watabe 1967].
In order to grow rice, farmers must depend on
the traditional gravity irrigation systems be-
cause of the instability and shortage of rainfall. 6)
Farmers divert water by constructing tradi-
tional weirs at appropriate locations in the main
canal and laterals from natural streams. These
5) This infonnation was from an interview with the
headman of Khung Khong weir group.
6) See Kaida [1978]. The village headman told us
that without the weir, even rainy-season rice
could not be grown.
are made of locally available materials: bamboo
stakes, logs, leaves and stones.
The Wang River basin contains several tens
of these gravity irrigation systems of weirs
canal constructed by methods that have been
handed down through many generations. 7)
Irrigated areas in these irrigation systems range
from 400 rai to 18,000 rai. Two of the larger
weirs are made of concrete.
The farmers in the surveyed village practice
triple cropping, typically with rainy-season rice,
onions, and dry-season rice, by making use of
water diverted from Wang River through two
weirs (Huay Phung weir and Khung Khong
weir).
In the rainy season, they usually grow
glutinous rice (San Pa Tong variety, a medium-
maturing rice with a growth period of 140-150
days; or RD6, an early-maturing rice with a
growth period of 120-130 days). The rainy-
season rice cropping usually starts in the
nursery plot in the middle of June. Ploughing
and harrowing are done after the heavy June
rains. All the fanners use power tillers. One or
one-and-a-half months after seeding, seedlings
are transplanted to the paddy field. Most
fanners do not need to weed in the rainy
season, but some do because of poor field
conditions. These latter farmers apply herbi-
cides just after transplanting and cut weeds 1-2
months after that. Fertilizer is applied 2-4
times beginning one to two weeks after
transplanting. Harvesting is usually done in
October, after which the rice is dried in the
paddy field for several days before being
threshed in a big bamboo basket (ku). During
7) This infonnation is from Lumpaopong et al.
[1984].
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Fig.1 Seasonal Sequence of Farming Operations in the Surveyed Village (1983-1984)
this period, each fanner takes care to keep a
depth of three inches of water in his fields.
Before the harvesting of the rainy-season
rice, a seedbed has to be prepared and onion
seed planted. After the rice harvest, a series of
operations including making ridges, herbicide
application, and straw mulching is carried out.
Forty to fifty days after sowing, nursery plants
are transplanted into the fields, where they are
watered by furrow irrigation during the period
from late March to early April.
In the dry season, non-glutinous rice (RD7,
an early-maturing rice with a growth period of
120-130 days) is grown for the market.
Because they must finish harvesting before
transplanting the rainy-season rice, fanners
start the dry-rice seedlings in March. Ploughing
and harrowing are done from late March to
mid-April, then transplanting is started. Irriga-
tion, fertilizer application and weeding after
transplanting are done in the same way as in the
rainy season. Around the middle of June
harvesting of the dry-season rice begins.
Harvested rice is threshed with a threshing
machine as soon as possible, lest it should get
wet in the rain. In this way, the fanners in M8
have practiced very intensive multiple cropping
for many years; but during the period of getting
the paddy covered with water after transplant-
ing (from April to mid-June), water shortage is
often a problem.
Interviews were conducted with 70 fann
Table 1 Average Farm Household Income by Source (1984): 70 Farm Households
Other Capital Non-agri- Farm House-Rice Onions Livestock hold IncomeCrops Income cultural (Total)
Total Income 468,595.5 773,710 113,026 129,804 32,149 253,495 1,770,779.5by Source (B)
% 26.5 43.7 6.4 7.3 1.8 14.3 100.0
Average Income 6,694 11 ,053 1,615 1,854 459 3,621 25,297by Source (8)
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Table 2 The Distribution of Farm House-
holds by Tenure Status
Table 3 The Distribution of Agricultural
Land
Note. The figures in parentheses refer to tenancy con·
tracts between relatives.
Tenancy Form Land Rent No. %
No Rent r=O 2(1) 4.0
















Share·tenancy 50 -0-50 5(1)(Na pa)
50 -0-B2500 1I7rai
50 -0-B3000 1(1) 6.0/5rai
50 -0-B1500 1/5rai
Total 50(9) 100.0
Owned Area Cultivated Area
Scale (rai)
No. % No. %
T=O 24 34.3 1 1.4
0<Ts2 23 32.9 10 14.3
2<Ts4 11 15.7 19 27.1
4<Ts6 3 4.3 13 18.6
6<Ts8 5 7.1 18 25.7
8<T~10 2 2.9 4 5.7
lO<T 2 2.9 5 7.1
Total 70 100.1 70 99.9
Average 2.46 5.51Area (rai)
owned per household is 2.46 rai, and that
of cultivated land is 5.51 rai. Inequality of
land distribution is small. The percentages of
owner fanners, owner-tenant farmers and pure
tenant fanners are respectively
40%, 24.3%, 32.9% (see Tables 2
and 3). The dominant tenancy form
is share-tenancy (na pa), which
accounts for 80% of total tenancy
contracts. In all cases, land rent is
not paid for onion cropping (see
Table 4).
Table 5 indicates that 72.6% of
family labor is taken up by growing
rice and onions. This implies that
employment opportunities for fann-
ers are limited to agricultural pro-
duction and that the demand for
labor from off-farm sources is
limited.
Finally, it is important to point
out the labor market situation. In
M8, there are several kinds of job
opportunities outside farming such
as shopkeeping, daily wage labor,
agricultural wage labor, trading and
Farm Households
St t
Table 4 Tenancy Form and Land Rent








households introduced by the village headman.
Their reported sources of fann household
income are as follows. Paddy growing (26.5%),
onion growing (43.7%), other agricultural in-
come (14.3%). Rice and onions thus account for
70% of fann household income (see Table 1).
The average area of agricultural land
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Table 5 Employment Structure of Farm Households (1984): 70 Farm Households
Non-agricultural
Agricultural
Agr. Wage Daily Wage Permanent Shop- Total(Rice, Onion) Hired Trading OthersLabor Labor Labor keeping
Working Days 12,644 774 1,046 436 1,163 905 447 17,415(man. day)
% 72.6 4.4 6.0 2.5 6.7 5.2 2.6 100.0
pennanent hired labor etc. Among these, the
daily income from shopkeeping varies widely
from one household to another (ranging from
B30 to B2oo). On the other hand, the wages for
hired agricultural labor are B30/day for rice
harvesting and transplanting, and B50/day for
ploughing and harrowing paddy fields making
ridges for onions. While the wage differential
between different jobs is large, a single wage
rate seems to apply for each job. Moreover, the
monthly wage for permanent hired labor, which
ranges from B700 to B15oo, is equal to that of
agricultural wage labor in tenns of a daily wage.
This suggests that the market wage rate for
fanners is given.
II-2. Agricultural Development and Irrigation
Systems
Farmers in M8 utilize two weirs to divert
water for their fields into canals. One of them,
Huay Phung weir, is constructed of large
wooden logs piled on top of each other and held
in position by bamboo stakes. Branches, earth
and sand are dumped on top. The main canal
heads above the weir and runs along. the
mountain foot, and from this farmers draw
water directly into their paddy fields by gravity.
The area irrigated by this irrigation system is
480 rai. One hundred and fifty fann households
in five villages utilize this system, of which 130
belong to M8.
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Khung Khong weir was reconstructed in
concrete two years ago with financial support
from the Royal Irrigation Department, and no
longer has to be rebuilt year after year. The
main canal from this weir runs through the
center of the terrace plain, and contains seven
small weirs (toe) to divert water to laterals and
control water flow. The irrigated area is 8,000
rai, and the number of users is 1,147.
The Huay Phung irrigation system is not
equipped to control water flow, and the slope of
the river at the location of the weir is steeper
than that of Khung Khong. Therefore, water
flow into the Huay Phung main canal is more
unstable during the water shortage season.
Huay Phung weir, being made of wood, must
be repaired every year, and the canal is cleaned
three times a year, but the concrete Khung
Khong weir need not be repaired, and the main
canal is cleaned and repaired only twice a year.
These projects are done with communal
labor. The users of the irrigation systems are
obliged to do the work themselves because
they cannot make use of market mechanisms
for the purpose of maintaining collective
production goods.
The Huay Phung weir is usually repaired in
the middle of April. At that time the headman
of the irrigation organization (huana fai)8)
8) In case of the Huay Phung weir group, the
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assigns the dates, and his assistant informs the
member farmers at least five days in advance so
that they can collect logs and bamboo in the
state forest. It takes three days to finish
driving in the bamboo stakes and cleaning the
weir.
In 1984, the main canal was cleaned on one
day each in the middle of February (before
making nursery plots for dry-season rice), late
May (before making nursery plots for rainy-
season rice), and late September (before
making nursery plots for onions).
Table 6 shows the guidelines for the obliga-
tions member farmers in collective work, which
aim to ensure that all collective work is carried
out in a timely and efficient manner. In the case
of the Huay Phung users' organization, if a
farmer refuses to bring building materials, he
will be forced to stop drawing water from the
canal. If he does not join communal work in
cleaning the weir and main canal, he has to pay
B50/day fine. The assistant monitors the
members' compliance in order to enforce these
regulations. 9) The fine for Khung Khong
members is B100/time.
The number of farmers who fail to meet their
duties is negligible. This seems to be closely
related to the importance of agricultural
production and the small inequality of land
distribution.
Farmers in the Chiang Mai Valley have been
agriculturally innovative, probably in response
to the fragmentation of agricultural land due to
population pressure. In M8, two important
technological changes have taken place in the
past decade. As a consequence, traditional
irrigation institutions have also been forced to
change.
The first technological change was the
introduction of a rice-soybean double-cropping
system. Although this system was widely
adopted by farmers in M8 about 10 years ago,
water shortage did not become a problem until
about five years ago.
The second technological innovation was the
adoption of the triple-cropping system with
rainy-season rice, onions, and dry-season rice,
which became widespread about five years ago.
Since this time, water shortage after transplant-
ing the dry-season rice crop has become
acute. 10) To cope with this problem, in the
second year of triple cropping farmers adopted
Table 6 Work Duties and Fines
Repair of Weir
Bamboo Stake Cleaning of Fine
Log Labor Canal
Large Middle Small
Huay Phung 1/2rai 3/rai lO/rai 20/rai 3 days 1day x 3times B50/day
Khung Khong ~ ~ ~ ~ -- I day x 2times BIOO/time
headman is elected by vote every four years.
The present headman of M8 has held this
position for 10 years.
9) Among the fann households who belong to both
weir groups, five are exempted from their
duties because the working period overlaps.
They paid six tang (one tang= 10 kg) per rai of
paddy rice to the headman in compensation.
(Their total cultivated area amounts to 30
rai.)
10) This is also due to recent deforestration, which
has reduced the capacity of natural vegetation to
retain water and has caused river beds to rise
because of increased sedimentation.
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a rotation method of drawing water based on
the headman's instructions. In previous years,
the decision when to draw water had been left
to individuals. Users along the main canal were
divided into three groups, upstream, middle
stream and lower stream, and the users in each
group could draw water from canal at any time
on three out of every nine days. This did not
solve the problem, however, because some
users in the middle stream group had paddy
fields located far from the canal and could not
secure sufficient water within three days. 11)
The headman therefore reintroduced a
stricter rotation of water allocation, which had
been used three years previously. Under this
arrangement, the members in the middle
stream group who still suffered a shortage were
further divided into two groups, one of 10
members and one of 20. Water was distributed
to the former group for one day and to the
latter for two days. Moreover, rotational water
allocation to individual group members was
enforced, with the assistant monitoring to avoid
conflict. The headman reported that these
arrangements had alleviated the problem. 12)
This kind of problem has not yet arisen with
the users of the Khung Khong irrigation
system.
III Theoretical Framework
In this article, the theory of the subjective
equilibrium of a farm household is applied in the
11) According to an interview with the assistant,
while it is possible to soak 10 rai of paddy field
near the canal within one hour, it takes half a day
to soak five rai far from the canal.
12) Some farmers still complained privately about
water shortage.
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building of a theoretical framework for economic
analysis.
We consider a rural economy in which the
prices of products, market labor, land, machin-
ery and current input are fixed in competitive
markets, but the market price of irrigation
services is not determined. There are n
homogeneous farm households which make
collective use of an irrigation system. The
utility function of each farm household is twice
differentiable by income (Y) and (L) and is
quasi-concave. We define income as
Y=q+w·(L-h-k)+p·f+r·(t-t)
+Hk-k)-1r·(O'-b).
Agricultural product is taken as a numeraire and
notations are defined as follows.
q : agricultural gross income.
h : family labor in farming.
12 : family labor in communal work for mainte-
nance of irrigation equipment.
L : total family labor input.
w : market wage rate.
p : price of current input.
t : cultivated area.
t : owned area.
f : current input.
r : land rent.
k : capital stock used.
k : capital stock owned.
: rental rate of capital stock.
0' : duty work assigned to the household.
1r : fine per unit of labor.
Output q is a quasi-concave function and
twice differentiable at h, f, t, k and m (each
user's amount of use of irrigation equipment).
It is important to note the following two points.
1) Family labor supplied for communal work
has no impact on the production of each farm
because the amount of labor allocated is
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Input of Quasi-colIective Goods
Fig. 2
Concerning the two cases used in the following
analysis, the Kuhn-Tucker conditions with
respect to irrigation facilities and labor are
reduced to:
if Al >0, A2>0, A3=0
i3q i3q Al




W= aU/i3Y + aU/ay···@'
if Al >0, 11.2 >0, 11.3>0
aq 11.3 ,
am - aU/i3Y ...<D,
and equations (2), @, @.
In the former case, a farmer does not suffer
losses from congestion in use of irrigation
facilities. Therefore, as shown in Fig. 2, he
uses the equipment up to the point B where the
marginal value productivity equals zero. On the
other hand, in the latter case, a farmer suffers
opportunity losses (the shaded area in Fig. 2)
because he cannot use more than Min owing to
congestion. (A is equilibrium point.) If we
assume that homogeneous farmers do not use
the facilities at the same time, but that the time





















negligible compared with the total labor sup-
plied. 2) The total water available to the users
is limited and the number of users is finite.
Thus, we can regard irrigation facilities as
quasi-collective goods [Kuchiki 1978].
The sixth term of the income equation
indicates that if each farm household supplies
less labor than required, such that 6< 0', the
fine for punishment is imposed on the difference
(a-b). This definition supports the assumption
that if any member neglects his labor obligation,
he will always be detected and fined because of
the perfect monitoring of the assistant. 13)
Moreover, three constraints are assumed.
The labor market is held to be characterized by
excess supply and competitive, so that, follow-
ing Arrow [1959], the market demand for labor
is assumed to be limited to I· (L - II - 12~b.
Each member is not required to work more
than 0' so that 6 does not exceed 0"(12< a).
Finally, if the total potential demand for
irrigation facilities (nm) exceeds its total
pennitted quantity (M), the amount available to
each member will be restricted to only MIn of
irrigation facilities.
Under these assumptions, each farm house-
hold maximizes its utility over II, f, t, k, m, 6
and L, subject to L-II-b-l<O, 6-0'<0 and
m - MIn < 0. In terms of the Lagrangean
multipliers,
Q=U'(Y, L)-AdL-h-b-I)
+ Ada-b) + 11.3' (M/n-m).
(AI, 11.2, 11.3 are the Lagrangean multipliers.)
13) I believe there are only a few who do not pay the
fine even if they are detected. This is because
even rational, selfish farmers may choose to
cooperate rather than act as free riders if they
are in a community with intimate social interac-
tions among its members [Taylor 1976], and
this is the case in M8.
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(rotation method) can be efficiently arranged,
the congestion problem can be solved.
With regard to labor, I assume that the
market wage rate is given for any farmer, but
that employment opportunity is limited (k >0).
In this case, a sufficient condition for the
enforcement of labor supply on communal work
(il.2>0) is to set the fine for non-contribution of
labor at a higher level than the marginal cost of
labor, which may be lower than market wage
rate. 14)
As shown in Fig. 3, if the fine is set at Jr1, the
curve indicating the marginal cost of labor
intersects AB at the point B and a part of labor
obligation (BO) is ignored. But if the fine is set
at higher level, JrZ or Jr3, then marginal labor
cost intersects aq/al at point C, and the family
labor input is in equilibrium at C. That is to say,
the obligation is perfectly enforced, simul-
taneously satisfying the subjective equilibrium




IV Production Function Analysis
IV-l. Formulation of Production Function
and Data
The following Cobb-Douglas type production
function can be specified. 15)
InY= B+ allnL + azlnF + aJinK+ a4lnT
+PDl + rD2+ V···CD
InY= B+ al'lnL+ az'lnF+ a3'lnK + a/lnT
+ P'DI + b'D3+V'· ..(2)
Notations of the variables in these functions are
as follows.
Y: gross revenue from dry-season rice crop,
L: labor input, F: current input, K: machine
(flow term), T: land.
01, 02 and 03 are dummy variables, where
1
1 if the member is a tenant farmer
Dl = with share contract
(42 farm households)
oif not (17 farm households)
1
1 if the strict rotation rule is enforced
D2= (19 farm households)
oif not (50 farm households)
1
1 if he belongs to Huay Phung weir
D3= group (44 farm households)
o if he belongs to Khung Khong weir
group (25 farm households).
Oummy variables 01 were applied in the
equations to test the hypothesis that share-
tenancy leads to inferior production. This is
because, despite much research, the arguments
continue (see Ohtsuka [1985]). The other two
dummy variables are applied to overcome the
difficulty of data collection on each user's
14) From Q), (1), Tr =






15) An estimate was also made by applying three
dummy variables. As a result, the coefficient of
determination, t statistics and F statistics are
lower than the type of equation shown here.
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Table 7 Estimates of Agricultural Production Function
(Dry-season Rice): n= 69
Note 1) Adjusted for the degree of freedom.
2) T statistics are in parentheses. * Statistically
significant at 1% significant level. **Statisti-
cally significant at 5% significant level.
Explanatory Estimated Coefficients
Variables Equation 1 Equation 2
Constant Term(B) 5.428 (4.543)* 5.477 ( 6.352) *
Labor (L) 0.028 (0.238) 0.003 ( 0.027)
Machine (K) 0.283 ( 2.376)** 0.292 ( 2.400) **
Current Input (F) 0.102 ( 1. 093) 0.114 ( 1.194)
Land (T) 0.558 (4.090)* 0.515 (3.657) *
Dummy Variables
Share-tenancy 0.032 (0.327) 0.069 ( 0.642)
Strict Rotation - O. 219 ( - 2 .332) **
Weir Group -0.143(-1.608)
Coefficient of 0.670 0.695Determination II
F Ratio 27.661 * 26.053*
demand on irrigation facilities. If the members
of each group suffer losses from congestion in
use of irrigation facilities, the parameter of
dummy variables is significantly different from
zero. aI, a2, a3, a4, p, 'Y and lJ are parameters
and U is the disturbance term.
The sample size is 69, and the data used for
estimation of the production function were as
follows. (All items relate to the 1984 dry-
season rice crop.)
Gross revenue (Y): gross revenue.
Labor (L): total labor.
Current input (F): total expense for chemical
fertilizer and herbicide.
Machine (K): 1/2 X depreciation value, calcu-
lated from the formula (purchase price/l0
durable years). 16)
16) If an agricultural machine was co-owned, the
purchase price was divided by the nwnber of
owners.
Land (T): cultivated area in dry-season rice
crop.
IV-2. Examination ofEstimated Results
The results of the estimation are shown in
Table 7. The estimated coefficient of dummy
variables D2, which distinguish the strict
rotation group members from the others, is
significantly different from zero. This result
implies that members who were obliged to
follow a strict rotation rule still suffered a loss
owing to congestion. On the other hand, the
coefficient of dummy variables D3, which
distinguish the members of Huay Phung weir
group from those of Khung Khong weir group,
does not differ significantly at the 10% level. 17)
This significance level might seem to be too
large to conclude that the hypothesis
can be rejected that a productivity gap
exists between the two groups. For
further classification another statistical
test of the efficiency of both systems
should be applied. An appropriate pro-
cedure is to compare the yield per rai of
the Khung Khong members with that
of the Huay Phung members who do
not belong to the strict rotation group.
By testing the significance of the
dry-season yield gap between the two
groups, we see that the null hypoth-
esis that the yield of each group
member is homogeneous cannot be
rejected even at a 20% significance
level (see Table 8). This confirms
that the loose rotation rule contrib-
17) Farm households which belongs to both weir
groups were arbitrarily assigned to the group of
whichever weir they drew more water from.
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Table 8 Comparison of Yields between Users' Groups
Dry-season Rice Crop Rainy-season Rice Crop
Huay Phung, Huay Phung,Non-strict KhungKhong Others
Regulation Strict
(n=25) (n= 25) (n= 19) (n=50)
Average Yield 76 79 71 74(tang/rai)
F Ratio 1.54< F (24,24: 0.05) 1.48< F (49,18: 0.05)
T Statistics o.58 < T (48 : O. 2) 0.57<T (67: 0.2)
uted to some extent in dis-
solving congestion of water
use among members of the
Huay Phung weir group and
allowed more efficient use of
quasi-public goods, Le., irriga-
tion facilities.
The possibility of inferior
field conditions of the farmers
forced to follow the strict
rotation rule may be dis-
counted, because no significant difference was
found in the rainy-season yield between these
two groups (see Table 8). This supports the
conclusion that it is not inferior field conditions
but water shortage in the dry season which
caused the farmers' losses.
With regard to both estimates, the adjusted
coefficient of determination and F ratio show
them to be statistically significant. The
estimated coefficient of labor and t statistics in
both equations are so low that the hypothesis
cannot be rejected that the coefficient of labor is
zero. This hypothesis means that marginal cost
of labor and marginal value productivity of labor
are zero and supports the intuitive proposition
of labor abundance mentioned in an earlier
section. 18)
From this analysis, we can conclude that the
fine is set at a higher level than the marginal
cost of labor. As a result, the present supply of
labor and building materials is consistent with
each individual farmer's personal motivation.
18) I also calculated another type of production
function from the data of yearly total products
and total input. These results also support the
hypothesis. (Coefficient of labor is 0.1714, t
statistics is 0.926.)
V Conclusion
The results of the analysis in the previous
section indicate that the irrigation institution has
been modified in order to save a resource that
had grown more scarce in the process of
agricultural development, and that the commu-
nal work custom can be explained from an
economic point of view. 19)
This implies that changes in traditional
irrigation institutions can be considered as a
communal adjustment aimed at the efficient use
of resources under a non-market economic
system, and that such communal institutions
can be a method of resolving market-failure
problems.
19) The formation of Japanese agricultural irrigation
institutions during the Tokugawa era and the
recent process of change have been discussed
from the viewpoint of social norms in the rural
community [Tamaki et al. 1984]. But this
alone does not explain why such traditional
institutions have been maintained for more than
100 years. In reexamining the Japanese experi-
ence, economic analysis will be useful and the
case study in Northern Thailand is suggestive.
On the relation between farm management and
irrigation institutions, case studies have been
conducted in Nagata [1971], Yamauchi et al.
[1961] etc.
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One assumption made in this study was that
if the members failed to meet their duties, they
would be forced to pay fines. But the members
might not be kept to the rule if the cost of its
enforcement is too great for the leaders.
Furthermore, the introduction of the rotation
system was not agreed upon through bargaining
and negotiation; the headman and his assistant
played an important role in making the rule and
enforcing it. Even if they have the potential to
do so, they might not necessarily be able to
work out an arrangement for the optimum
supply of collective goods, as Olson [1965:
177] has stated. Their efforts to produce an
institution which supplies an optimum quantity
of collective goods also involve a large
transaction cost.
In order to construct a more comprehensive
framework for analysis, it should be investi-
gated why these transaction costs are so low
that the leaders can operate the institution well.
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